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Abstract 
India’s Look East Policy (LEP) signifies a strategic shift in its international political, economic, and 
military relationships. Regional integration of its Northeast Region (NER) with the countries in East, 
Southeast and South Asia may potentially generate economic dividends to the region. However, 
there are formidable challenges in realizing the potentials. The proposed infrastructure projects, if 
completed with no further delay, will go a long way in improving connectivity with the 
neighbouring countries. However, improving connectivity within the region and with the rest of 
the country is also very important. Further, it would require a comprehensive long-term plan with 
well-defined projects for developing industries and services including education, health and 
tourism. Building infrastructure, ensuring socio-political stability and ecological balance, and 
improving the quality of institutions would be a major part of this plan. 
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Introduction 
This paper presents a critical assessment of 
some of the potential gains from and 
challenges of India’s erstwhile Look East Policy 
(LEP) and more recent Act East Policy (AEP) for 
its northeast region (NER). There has been 
much euphoria about the benefits that are 
likely to accrue to NER from the successful 
implementation of LEP/AEP. The opening of the 
eastern and southern borders of the region to 
the countries in East, South and Southeast Asia 
is expected to establish direct and easy 
connectivity that is purported to contribute not 
only to its economic growth and development 
but also to cultural exchanges. Improved 
connectivity with the Southeast Asian countries 
is expected to create and boost trade and 
investment. Even the distance between NER 
and the rest of India is likely to be reduced, and 
this will go a long way in improving economic 
ties and boosting cultural exchanges. For 
historical reasons, despite its physical 
proximity, NER has been kept isolated from the 
countries in South and Southeast Asia region 
and is connected to the mainland India through 
a narrow corridor of about 21 kilometre, often 
referred to as the ‘chicken’s neck’.1 
As the large transfer of resources under various 
central government schemes and policies since 
the early 1990s failed to pay the long-term 
economic dividends, the development policy 
for the region needed a new paradigm. In that 
respect the LEP and later AEP have provided 
with this new framework for the region’s 
growth and development. In this framework, 
regional integration with the neighbouring 
countries of East and Southeast Asia can be 
thought of as the canvas that will facilitate 
formulation and implementation of appropriate 
policies. Geographic proximity, historic 
relationships and ethno-cultural affinity are 
purported to be the underlying principles for 
such regional integration. 
While increased connectivity under LEP/AEP is 
expected to increase trade flows to the region 
                                                                 
1
 This narrow corridor has been referred to as ‘chicken’s 
neck’ in many books and articles. For example, see 
Bhaumik (2014). 
and thus to contribute to its economic growth, 
it is not quite clear what the region will trade 
with the countries in the East and Southeast 
Asian region. Further, unless and until the intra-
regional connectivity is improved – which is a 
task of tall order – it will be impossible for the 
region to reap the benefits.2 Furthermore, in 
order to attract investment from outside the 
region, removing the infrastructural 
bottlenecks alone will not be enough. There is a 
need for a comprehensive policy to ensure 
socio-political stability and for improving 
efficiency and quality of the institutions.       
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In 
the next section, we present a brief economic 
profile of NER. Following this, it briefly 
discusses India’s LEP/AEP. The opportunities 
created by LEP/AEP for the region and the 
challenges in realising those opportunities are 
critically discussed in the penultimate section. 
The final section includes our concluding 
remarks.   
The NER: A Brief Profile and Background 
Although the NER originally comprised seven 
contiguous states (also known as seven sisters) 
of the northeast region of India, it now officially 
includes the Himalayan state of Sikkim as well.3 
There are several important features of the 
region. The region is landlocked and connected 
to the mainland of India through a narrow strip 
of land. It shares 98 percent of its boundary 
with foreign countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
China, Myanmar and Nepal. Because of this 
long international border, this region has been 
considered strategic and sensitive from the 
point of view of national defense. The Indo-
China war of 1962 and the China’s continual 
claim over Arunachal Pradesh have made it 
even more sensitive. Further, the alleged links 
                                                                 
2
 For a discussion, see Barua and Das (2008) 
3
 Sikkim was added as the eighth member of the North 
Eastern Council (NEC) by the North Eastern Council 
(Amendment) Act of 2002 and has been considered a 
part of NER since then. A copy of the act can be 
downloaded from the NEC Website at: 
http://necouncil.gov.in/writereaddata/mainlinkfile/THE%
20NORTH%20EASTERN%20COUNCIL%20AMENDMENT%
20ACT%202002.pdf (accessed on Friday, September 1, 
2017) 
Nath and Kumar. Space and Culture, India 2017, 5:2  Page | 9  
of various insurgent groups operating in the 
northeast region with groups in Myanmar and 
Bangladesh contribute to the international 
sensitivity. Due to these considerations, the 
borders have been closed and it has 
exacerbated the problems associated with the 
landlocked nature of the region.  
There are about 220 dialects in multiple 
language families (Indo-European, Sino-Tibetan, 
Austroasiatic) that share common structural 
features.4 Further, with more than two hundred 
ethnic groups, the region is heavily 
fractionalised. The hills states in the region like 
Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and 
Nagaland are predominantly inhabited by tribal 
people. However, there is a great deal of 
diversity within the tribal groups. There have 
been continuous flows of migration from Tibet, 
Indo-Gangetic India, the Himalayas, present 
Bangladesh and Myanmar for a long period. 
With only 25 seats in the Lok Sabha and 14 
seats in the Rajya Sabha, NER is also in the 
periphery of Indian polity. 
The Macro Reality of 8-4-3 
The share of the region in India’s landmass, 
population, and income – which we summarise 
in 8-4-3 – reflects its big picture reality. With 
262 thousand square kilometre, NER accounts 
for 8% of the total area of the country. Among 
the northeastern states, Arunachal Pradesh is 
the largest in geographical area followed by 
Assam, and Sikkim is the smallest. According to 
the 2011 census, about 46 million people live in 
the region. Thus, these eight states together 
account for about 4% of the total population of 
India. Figure 1(a) and 1(b) show the percentage 
distribution of area and population by different 
northeastern states. These two facts imply that 
the population density in the region is relatively 
lower than the rest of the country. 
The average share of domestic products 
generated in the region has been about 3% of 
which Assam alone contributes two-thirds (see 
Figure 1[c]). In terms of the sectoral 
composition, the share of the agricultural 
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 For a detailed discussion on languages of NER, see 
Moral (1997). 
sector is larger for the region than for the 
national economy. The share for the region was 
about 23% whereas it was 18% for the country 
in 2013-14. The respective shares of industry 
and service are smaller for the region than for 
the nation. However, as Figure 1(d) depicts, 
there are variations across states. For example, 
agriculture is the largest segment of the 
economy of Arunachal Pradesh whereas 
industry is the largest in Sikkim. In contrast, the 
service sector share in Manipur, Mizoram, 
Nagaland, and Tripura is larger than the 
national average.  
Despite various government incentives, the 
growth of the industry sector has been 
lackadaisical. At the time of independence, the 
region, particularly Assam, inherited a modern 
industrial sector that consisted of plantation 
and manufacturing of tea, mining of coal and 
oil, refining of oil, manufacturing of plywood, 
and other forest resources-based products. The 
British colonial power also left behind a 
reasonably well developed railway network for 
transportation of the industrial products. 
However, due to the partition of the country at 
independence, the approach routes to the 
region were cut off and it had to be connected 
through a narrow corridor in the North Bengal. 
This became a big hurdle for economic 
integration with the rest of the country. 
Further, as Bezbaruah and Sarma (2009) point 
out, political considerations played an 
important role in deciding the location of 
massive public sector enterprises during the 
post-independence period.  
Over the past 35 years, the total share of the 
region in India’s domestic product has been 
around 3 percent. However, as Figure 2 shows, 
the share has declined over time indicating that 
the region has been growing at a slower rate 
than the rest of the country. It has missed 
several trains of economic growth. Unlike in 
Punjab and other parts of India, the Green 
Revolution of the late 1960s-1970s did not have 
any significant impact on agriculture in the 
region. The region also missed the industrial 
revolution of the late 1980s and the 1990s.
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(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
Figure 1: Macroeconomic characteristics of the Northeastern states 
Note: The graphs are generated by using data from the Central Statistics Office (CSO), India. 
 
Figure 2: NER’s contributions to Indian Economy— 1980-81 to 2013-14 
Note: The graph is generated by using data from the Central Statistics Office (CSO), India.  
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Finally, ICT and ICT-enabled service revolution 
of the 2000s had little growth enhancing effect 
on the economy of the region. The only effect, 
albeit negative, was a large-scale exodus of 
skilled and low-skilled workers from the region 
to the growth centres (such as Bengaluru, 
Hyderabad, Pune, Delhi) in the country. One 
can argue that the repatriated income of the 
migrants would boost demand that in turn 
would lead to growth in the home region. 
However, demand-driven growth with little 
investment in productive capacity would not be 
beneficial to the region in the long run. Besides, 
the increased demand would also largely 
benefit the producers who are located outside 
the region.   
Due to a number of factors, the investment has 
not been taking place. There is a lack of 
entrepreneurship among the people of the 
region. Various government schemes to 
encourage entrepreneurship and to create 
entrepreneurs have had limited success. 
Further, there are a small number of 
entrepreneurs who are often constrained by 
the availability of credit. Socio-political unrests 
keep investment from outside the state at a 
distance. In fact, the increased insurgent 
activities contributed to the flight of capital 
from the region. The topography of the region 
and inadequate infrastructure also proved to 
be a hindrance for the growth of industries. The 
British coloniser built the infrastructure in such 
a way that they could extract and take out the 
resources from the region. Even after the 
independence, the same model continued. 
There were no initiatives to build industries 
even on the basis of the resources available in 
the region. Remoteness from the market and 
high transportation cost were typical economic 
reasoning for not developing industries. 
Because of the sensitive nature of the border 
region, it is not directly connected to the 
markets in the neighbouring countries. 
Everything had to be transported via a long 
winding route that often goes through Kolkata. 
Bezbaruah and Sarma (2009) have identified 
the lack of market access as a major hindrance 
for industrial growth in the region. 
The development paradigm adopted by the 
central government for the northeast region in 
the early nineties includes various packages 
under which massive transfer of resources and 
concessions were made to the states in the 
region. These measures increased consumption 
but failed to build the production base, which is 
essential for sustainable growth. Following a 
high-level commission report to the Prime 
Minister in 1997, the “northeast development 
concern” was included in LEP. The emergence 
of LEP as a policy framework for development 
of the northeast is often referred to as a new 
paradigm of development for the northeast.5 
India’s Look/Act East Policy 
India’s LEP is intended to develop extensive 
economic and strategic relations primarily with 
the Southeast Asian countries. This policy was 
formulated and initiated by PV Narasimha Rao’s 
government in the early 1990s. Since then 
there has been constant evolution of the policy 
under successive governments. The current 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
government has rechristened it as the Act East 
Policy (AEP). 
After independence India pursued insular and 
protectionist policies.6 The dislike and distrust 
of the western colonial power led India, like 
many other erstwhile colonies, to adopt 
economic policies that emphasized self-reliance 
through promotion of heavy industries in the 
public sector. Influenced by the socialistic 
pattern of economic growth in the Soviet 
Union, Prime Minister Nehru chose a mixed 
economy model with preponderance of the 
public sector and five-year economic planning. 
In the area of international polity and 
diplomacy, India was one of the pioneers of the 
                                                                 
5
 See Baruah and Das (2008) for a discussion. 
6
 It has become a common knowledge as numerous 
research articles and textbook discussions on India’s 
macroeconomic policy mention this fact. For a ready 
reference on LEP related discussion, please see Strachan 
et al (2009). 
Nath and Kumar. Space and Culture, India 2017, 5:2  Page | 12  
concept of non-alignment. The member 
countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 
do not want to be officially aligned (friends) 
with or against any major power bloc (group of 
countries). 
The Southeast Asian region was economically 
less developed until the 1960s when it started 
growing rapidly.7 Besides, India and the 
countries from this region were on opposite 
sides of the Cold War Divide. After the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the end of cold war, 
there emerged a new world order and India 
sought realignment by directing its focus 
towards east. Due to its colonial links, India 
always looked up to the West and, over the 
centuries, built up economic ties primarily with 
the western countries. Thus, the launch of LEP 
signifies a strategic shift in India’s view of the 
world in the post-cold war period. As India 
embarked on economic liberalisation and 
market-oriented reforms in 1991, it reoriented 
its foreign policy towards the countries to its 
east. A balance of payments crisis at the time 
paved the way for an International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) program that led to the adoption of 
these major reforms.8 Although, in the initial 
phase, the focus of LEP was on economic 
diplomacy in order to create and expand 
regional markets for trade, investments, and 
industrial development, it gradually put 
increasing emphasis on strategic and security 
cooperation and revival of historic cultural and 
ideological links in the subsequent phases of 
LEP.9 The growing concerns over the expansion 
of China’s economic and strategic influence 
among the nations in this region facilitated 
India’s strategic and military cooperation with 
these nations. 
                                                                 
7
 For a comparison of growth experiences of the 
Southeast Asia with other regions of the continent, see 
Radelet et al (1997). However, there have been 
substantial differences in the rate of economic growth 
even among the countries in this region. Nevertheless, as 
Hill  (2014) shows, these countries are converging in 
several macroeconomic performance indicators in recent 
decades.    
8
 However, as Panagariya argues, economic l iberalisation 
in India can be traced back to the late 1970s.  
9
 For a detailed analysis of the evolution and approach of 
LEP, see Haokip (2011). 
Under LEP, India has established and promoted 
relationships in several areas with countries in 
East, Southeast, and South Asia. For example, 
over last two decades or so, India has signed 
free trade agreements (FTAs) with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), Singapore, South Korea, Japan, 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and other 
Southeast, East and South Asian economies. It 
is negotiating agreements with Indonesia, 
Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand.10 Despite 
India’s support for Myanmar’s pro-democracy 
movement, India started economic and military 
cooperation with that country in the early 
1990s as a strategic move to counter Chinese 
domination in the region.11 Indian public sector 
corporations secured lucrative contracts for 
industrial projects and the construction of 
major roads and highways, pipelines and 
upgrading of ports. In order to cater to its 
growing domestic needs of oil and natural gas 
and to reduce its dependence on the Middle 
East, India entered into competition with China 
by investing in oil and natural gas exploration in 
Myanmar. However, China was awarded the 
contracts for extracting more than 2.88–3.56 
trillion cubits of natural gas in the A-1 Shwe 
field in the Rakhine State. Furthermore, China 
was asked to develop naval and surveillance 
installations along Burma’s coast and the Coco 
Islands. Besides, China remains Burma’s largest 
military supplier. These have been major 
setbacks for India. Yet, India has increased 
cooperation with the country in training of 
military personnel and in curbing separatist 
militants and heavy drug trafficking affecting 
much of Northeast India.  
Strong commercial, military, and cultural 
relations have been established with the 
Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and Cambodia. 
In particular, the strategic importance of these 
countries, particularly of Singapore, has been 
heightened. In addition to the initiatives to 
improve economic ties, India has also been 
conducting joint naval exercises with Singapore 
                                                                 
10
 A complete l ist of India’s FTAs and their current status 
are included in Appendix Table A.1   
11
 Bhaumik (2007) discusses India’s double standards in 
its policy towards Myanmar. 
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(SIMBEX) since 1993, with Vietnam in 2000 and 
has engaged in joint patrols with Indonesia in 
the Andaman Sea since 2002. Since more than 
50% of India’s trade passes through the 
Malacca Strait, the Indian navy has established 
a Far Eastern Naval Command off Port Blair on 
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India has 
also strengthened its ties with Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan. The emphasis of these 
relationships has been on the shared principles 
of democracy, human rights and strategic 
interests. After the market-oriented reforms 
and economic liberalisation of the 1990s, South 
Korea and Japan have become the major 
sources of foreign investment in India. 
Although India supports the "One China" policy 
and recognizes the authority of the People’s 
Republic of China over the Republic of China 
(Taiwan), it has, however, stepped up its 
engagement with the island. India’s  growing 
need for cooperation on counter-terrorism, 
humanitarian relief, anti-piracy, maritime and 
energy security, confidence-building and 
balancing the influence of China has propelled 
its desire and action towards increasing 
engagement with East Asia.12 
Engagement with the ASEAN member countries 
was the initial focus of LEP. India became a 
sectoral dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1992, 
was given an advisory status in 1995, a member 
of the Council for Security Cooperation in the 
Asia-Pacific, a member of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum in 1996, and a summit-level partner (on 
par with China, Japan and Korea) in 2002. In 
several instances, a desire by the countries in 
the region to balance China’s growing influence 
in the area has led to India’s membership to 
various forums. For example, Japan was 
instrumental in bringing India into ASEAN+6 to 
weaken the ASEAN+3 processes, where China 
plays a dominant role. Similarly, the United 
States and Japan have pressed for India’s 
inclusion in the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) as one of its members. 
Furthermore, India’s entry into the East Asia 
                                                                 
12
 For a discussion on India’s strategic alignment with the 
countries in Asia-Pacific region and LEP, see Ladwig III 
(2009) 
Summit was strongly supported by Singapore 
and Indonesia.  
The strategic perspective of LEP is very 
important not only for India but also for the 
countries in South and Southeast Asia. It needs 
to be evaluated in the context of the rising 
dominance of China. As a part of LEP, India has 
engaged in Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-
Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation 
(BIMSTEC), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), 
Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and Indian 
Ocean Rim Association (IORA) for extensive 
cooperation on economic development, 
environmental issues, security and strategic 
matters. These initiatives are intended to grow 
India’s influence beyond South Asia. Note that 
its efforts in the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have often been 
thwarted by the obstructive presence of 
Pakistan and China. 
There have been numerous infrastructure 
projects under LEP that are expected to tie 
India closer to East and Southeast Asia. India is 
participating in the United Nations Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
and the Pacific initiatives for an Asian Highway 
Network and the Trans-Asian Railway network. 
There have been discussions on reopening the 
World War II-era Stilwell Road that would link 
Assam with China’s Yunnan province via 
Myanmar. The other infrastructure projects 
that are in various stages of completion include 
Moreh-Tamu-Kalewa Road, India-Myanmar-
Thailand Trilateral Highway, Trans-Asian 
Highway, India-Myanmar rail linkages, Kaladan 
Multimodal project, Myanmar-India-
Bangladesh gas and/or oil pipeline, Tamanthi 
Hydroelectricity project and optical fibre 
network between Northeast India and 
Southeast Asia (Shrivastava 2013). 
The Integration of NER in LEP was somewhat an 
afterthought and it adds a domestic dimension 
to LEP, known as Look East through Northeast. 
This also signifies the beginning of a second 
phase of LEP. To connect India with Southeast 
and East Asia, NER is considered as a bridge to 
the present gap. The region has the potential to 
develop into one of the India’s economic power 
Nath and Kumar. Space and Culture, India 2017, 5:2  Page | 14  
station. NER is enriched with oil, natural gas, 
coal and limestone. This region is also rich in 
various horticultural products, spices, rare 
herbs and medicinal plants. NER offers 
unlimited tourism opportunities, natural scenic 
beauty, unique performing arts and various 
local cuisine and handicrafts.13 The main 
aspects of LEP-NER are: (a) connectivity and 
physical infrastructure to facilitate trade; (b) 
trade and investment protocol; (c) shortfalls in 
operationalization of existing assets and 
facilities; (d) soft aspects of 
bilateral/multilateral relationships such as in 
tourism and enhanced people to people 
interaction through sports, culture, academic 
and medical research, etc. 
The NDA government under the leadership of 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made India’s 
relations with East and Southeast Asian 
neighbours a foreign policy priority at a time 
when the United States under President 
Barrack Obama engaged in a “pivot to Asia”. 
The Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj 
proposed anew outlook calling it Act East 
Policy, following on from the Look East policy. 
The defining feature of this third phase of LEP is 
projected to be the speed of engagement and 
connectivity in broader sense. It is being 
defined as C3 (communication, culture and 
connectivity). It has been clarified that AEP 
does not supplement LEP rather recalibrate it. 
AEP focuses on certain key resources and 
initiatives like transboundary water sharing, 
cultural and trade exchanges and better 
infrastructure development for connectivity in 
the region.  
A Critical Assessment of the Opportunities and 
Challenges under LEP or/and AEP 
One expectation about the potential benefits to 
the region from LEP/AEP is based on the 
prospect of increased trade through India’s 
eastern border. In order to assess this prospect, 
let us first take a look at some facts about 
India’s trade.  
                                                                 
13
 The potential for tourism has been discussed in many 
forums. See, for example, Shrivastava (2013) and 
Seshadri (2017). 
Table 1 lists the top eleven of India’s export 
partner countries and top eleven of its import 
partner countries. Among the top export 
destinations, Hong Kong, China, Singapore, 
Bangladesh, and Vietnam in the East, Southeast 
and South Asia region account for about 15% of 
total exports from India in 2015. Among the top 
import sources, China is the largest with about 
16% of India’s total imports. Indonesia and 
South Korea are also among the top eleven 
importers. These three countries together 
account for about 23% of total imports to India. 
Overall, India has trade deficit with the 
countries taken together in this region. 
According to some estimates, NER accounts for 
about 2% of total trade with Southeast Asian 
countries. Thus, if the trend continues, NER will 
not directly benefit.  
We would now take a look at the major trade 
items and see if NER produces any of those 
items. Table 2 shows the top 10 export and top 
10 import items. Although NER produces crude 
oil and petroleum products, they do not 
constitute a major part of the export items. 
Most of the mineral fuels exported from India 
are produced (refined) and exported from the 
refineries owned by Reliance Industries Limited 
(RIL) in Jamnagar in Gujarat. The combined 
refining capacity of all four refineries in Assam 
is about 7 million metric ton whereas two 
refineries in Jamnagar can refine a total of 
about 60 million metric ton of crude oil.14 The 
facts presented in the tables suggest that if the 
eastern border via the NER is opened, there is 
not much in terms of products produced in the 
region that can be exported to the countries in 
the East, Southeast and South Asian region.  
                                                                 
14
 These figures are obtained from a report “India's crude 
oil refining capacity: a snapshot” published in Business 
Standard on February 20, 2016 (http://www.business-
standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-s-crude-oil-
refining-capacity-a-snapshot-116022000047_1.html, 
accessed on Friday, September 1, 2017) 
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Table 1: India’s major trade partners in 2015 
Panel A: Major export destinations  Panel B: Major import sources 
Rank Country 
Value 
(US$ 
billion) 
Share 
of 
overall 
exports 
Rank Country 
Value 
(US$ 
billion) 
Share 
of 
overall 
imports 
1  United States 40.4 15.3% 1  China 61.5 15.8% 
2 
 United Arab 
Emirates 
30.3 11.5% 2  Saudi Arabia 21.4 5.5% 
3  Hong Kong 12.2 4.6% 3   Switzerland 21.1 5.4% 
4  China 9.5 3.6% 4  United States 20.5 5.2% 
5 
 United 
Kingdom 
8.9 3.4% 5 
 United Arab 
Emirates 
20.3 5.2% 
6  Singapore 7.8 3% 6  Indonesia 13.9 3.5% 
7  Germany 7 2.7% 7  South Korea 13.1 3.4% 
8  Saudi Arabia 7 2.7% 8  Germany 11.8 3% 
9  Sri Lanka 5.5 2.1% 9  Iraq 11.3 2.9% 
10  Bangladesh 5.5 2.1% 10  Nigeria 10.2 2.6% 
11  Vietnam 5.3 2% 11  Qatar 9.7 2.5% 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data obtained from the Ministry of Trade and 
Commerce, Government of India. 
Of course, if the NER is used as a corridor for 
transporting goods produced in other parts of 
the country, there will be some indirect 
benefits. There will be demand for some 
auxiliary services such as hotels, fuel pumps, 
and restaurants that will have some 
contributions to growth of the local economy. 
Even this could be problematic as the 
connectivity of the region with the country’s 
mainland via the chicken’s neck involves longer 
distance and higher transportation costs. As 
Bhaumik (2014) argues, the region’s rail and 
road connections with Kolkata and other parts 
of India via Bangladesh would be shorter and 
more cost efficient.  However, there are issues 
– both bilateral and internal to Bangladesh – 
that would hinder establishment of 
connectivity between NER and India’s mainland 
via Bangladesh. The markets in NER are likely to 
be flooded with cheap consumer goods 
produced primarily in China and to a lesser 
extent in Bangladesh. It will create competitive 
pressure for the domestic industries. As we 
have discussed above, industrial growth has 
already been lagging behind in NER despite 
various government incentives. This 
competitive pressure may create another 
hurdle. The northeast region does not have 
good access to the Indian market. Because of 
its geographical distance from the country’s 
mainland, despite major incentives few 
businesses are interested in building 
production hub in the region. Producing in the 
region and selling in the western or southern 
parts of India become excessively expensive. 
Even within the region, the road and railroad 
connectivity has been poor. It has been a major 
constraint in the development of the market.15 
Since better connectivity with the neighbouring 
countries will potentially ameliorate the 
problem of access to the market, will better 
connectivity alone attract investment? As far as 
the local entrepreneurship and investment go, 
there is a dearth of both. 
                                                                 
15
 See Barua and Das (2008) for a discussion. 
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Table 2. Major trade items of India 
Rank Export items % share Rank Import items  % share 
1 
Mineral Fuels, Mineral 
Oils And Products Of 
Their Distillation; 
Bituminous Substances; 
Mineral Waxes. 
18.54 1 
Mineral Fuels, Mineral 
Oils And Products Of 
Their Distillation; 
Bituminous Substances; 
Mineral Waxes. 
34.87 
2 
Natural Or Cultured 
Pearls, Precious Or 
Semiprecious Stones 
13.39 2 
Natural Or Cultured 
Pearls, Precious Or 
Semiprecious Stones 
13.93 
3 
Vehicles Other Than 
Railway Or Tramway 
Rolling Stock, And Parts 
And Accessories 
4.67 3 
Electrical Machinery And 
Equipment And Parts 
7.4 
4 
Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, 
Machinery And 
Mechanical Appliances 
4.45 4 
Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, 
Machinery And 
Mechanical Appliances 
7.09 
5 Organic Chemicals 3.85 5 Organic Chemicals 3.96 
6 Pharmaceutical Products  3.73 6 Iron And Steel 2.76 
7 Cereals 3.08 7 Plastic 2.61 
8 
Apparel And Clothing 
Accessories, Not Knitted 
Or Crocheted 
2.96 8 
Animal Or Vegetable Fats 
And Oils And Their 
Cleavage Products; Pre. 
Edible Fats; Animal Or 
Vegetable Waxes 
2.38 
9 
Electrical Machinery And 
Equipment And Parts 
2.8 9 Miscellaneous Goods. 1.67 
10 Iron And Steel 2.8 10 Ores, Slag And Ash  1.64 
 
Total exports in crores of 
INR 
182,220 
 
Total imports (in crores of 
INR) 
268,555.7 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data obtained from the Ministry of Trade and 
Commerce, Government of India. 
This has been identified as a fundamental 
hurdle for industrial development in the NER 
(see Bezbaruah and Sarma 2009). Therefore, it 
is unlikely that there will be a substantial 
domestic investment from the region 
overnight. What about investment from other 
parts of the country or from the rest of the 
world? There are certain preconditions that 
need to be satisfied before investment from 
outside the state or from abroad flows in. The 
infrastructural bottlenecks are one major issue. 
Works on highway projects, conversion of 
railroads from meter gauge to broad gauge and 
their extension, and power generation projects 
are under way. However, it has been slowed by 
a whole host of factors including oppositions 
from various interest groups and civil society 
organizations. The other important factor that 
is a deterrent for capital from outside is the 
socio-political instability. Most states in the 
northeast region have withstood the worst of 
insurgency for a long period. In states like 
Manipur and Nagaland, there is still active 
insurgency that would not help with foreign 
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capital.16 Finally, rampant corruption, 
bureaucratic red-taps, and overall inferior 
quality of institutions are major deterrents for 
investment from outside, particularly from 
abroad.17 
The other challenge is that NER can be 
connected to Southeast Asian countries only 
through Myanmar. Until recently, the country 
was ruled by a Military Junta. Although India 
was opposed to the military rule, it started 
diplomacy and strategic partnership in 1993. In 
order to access the markets in other East and 
Southeast Asia, it is important that Myanmar 
also develop their road and railway 
infrastructure. For a long period, heavy 
sanctions were imposed on the country by the 
international community. Hopefully, the return 
to democracy and improvement in political 
situation will be able to attract investments and 
aids so that Myanmar can invest in crucial 
infrastructure.  
While developing manufacturing base for 
producing goods for East and Southeast Asian 
markets could be a task of tall order and faces 
formidable challenges, there are at least three 
service areas where NER may find the markets 
in that region relatively easily. They are: 
education, healthcare and tourism. There have 
been recent initiatives to establish institutions 
of higher education in the northeastern states. 
The mandates of these institutions are narrowly 
focused in the region although the central 
government institutions have been able to 
attract students and teachers from outside the 
region. In the Southeast Asian region, Bangkok 
and Singapore have been internationally 
recognised as centres of higher learning. Given 
the demographic composition of the region, 
there is a need for additional centres for higher 
education institutes of excellence. NER can step 
in to fill this void. The existing institutes can 
                                                                 
16
 Baruah and Das (2008) highlight the issue of 
uncertainty and insecurity created by insurgency in the 
minds of economic agents who take decisions regarding 
production and investment.  
17
 Baruah and Das (2008) also discuss how some of the 
government policies to contain socioeconomic problems 
have led to rampant corruption in the NER states. Also, 
see Rahman (2013). 
reorient their student and faculty recruitment 
policies. There could be more investment in 
establishing new institutions of higher learning 
in both private as well as public sector. This will 
also attract investment in other information-
intensive services that require highly skilled 
workers. 
There are several medical colleges and 
hospitals in NER. With the establishment of the 
All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) in 
Assam, the region will potentially be a hub of 
medical education and healthcare services.18 In 
the Southeast Asian region, Bangkok and 
Singapore are considered centres of healthcare 
services. But geographic proximity of NER 
particularly to Bangladesh and Myanmar 
provides an opportunity for developing 
economically profitable healthcare industry. Of 
course, along with road and railway 
infrastructure, development of air 
transportation and travel would be conducive 
to this endeavour. 
Finally, tourism can be a service industry that 
could potentially generate economic benefits to 
the states of the region. Nature tourism that 
includes visits to wildlife and biodiversity areas, 
adventure tourism, religious and cultural 
tourism has great potential in the entire region. 
However, it is very important that development 
of tourism industry should not destroy and 
disturb the nature and ecological balance in the 
region. Note that because of rains and floods 
during the summer/monsoon months in the 
region, tourism will be seasonal in nature and 
that should be taken into account while 
developing it as an industry. Besides, there is a 
need for mass literacy for the people who will 
be directly or indirectly involved in tourism. 
Because of the ethno-cultural ties with the 
people in surrounding countries (Thailand, 
                                                                 
18
 The construction of AIIMS in Kamrup (Rural) District of 
Assam has already begun with the laying of the 
foundation stone by the Prime Minister of India on June 
23, 2017. (Hindustan Times, June 24, 2017, 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/modi-lays-
foundation-stone-for-aiims-unit-in-assam-to-be-
completed-in-4-years/story-
SPVnKiyO8BIYLSLG0JspMM.html , accessed on Friday, 
September 1, 2017) 
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Myanmar, Tibet, Bangladesh, Nepal), there is a 
scope for cultural tourism as well. Again, being 
sensitive to the traditions and cultures of 
various ethnic groups while opening up the 
region to tourists from other lands is very 
important.  In the era of sociological liberalism 
and complex interdependence, cultural 
diplomacy is one of the tools for developing 
people-to-people connectivity. India is 
developing partnership with CLMV countries 
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) at 
bilateral and multilateral level. A Buddhist 
tourism circuit can be developed in Arunachal 
Pradesh and Sikkim because large population of 
Buddhists live in CLMV countries, China, 
Thailand, Japan and Singapore. 
Conclusion       
Regional integration of NER with the countries 
in East, Southeast and South Asia may 
potentially generate economic dividends to the 
region.19 However, there are formidable 
challenges in realising the potentials. The 
proposed infrastructure projects, if completed 
with no further delay, will go a long way in 
improving connectivity with the neighbouring 
countries. However, improving connectivity 
within the region and with the rest of the 
country is also very important. Further, it would 
require a comprehensive long-term plan with 
well-defined projects for developing industries 
and services including education, health and 
tourism. Building infrastructure, ensuring socio-
political stability and ecological balance, and 
improving the quality of institutions would be a 
major part of this plan.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1: India’s Free Trade Agreements with Different Countries and Groups of Countries 
and Their Current Status 
Sl. 
No. 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Status 
1 India-Gulf Cooperation Council Free Trade Area (FA) signed 
2 Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical 
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Free Trade 
Area 
Negotiations launched 
3 India - Eurasian Economic Union Negotiations launched 
4 India-Australia Free Trade Agreement Negotiations launched 
5 India-Canada Economic Partnership Agreement  Negotiations launched 
6 India-Egypt Preferential Trade Agreement   Negotiations launched 
7 India-European Free Trade Association Free Trade 
Agreement    
Negotiations launched 
8 India-European Union Free Trade Agreement   Negotiations launched 
9 India-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Arrangement 
Negotiations launched 
10 India-Israel Free Trade Agreement Negotiations launched 
11 India-Mauritius Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation and Partnership Agreement 
Negotiations launched 
12 India-Southern African Customs Union Preferential 
Trade Agreement 
Negotiations launched 
13 India-Thailand Free Trade Area Negotiations launched 
14 New Zealand-India Free Trade Agreement Negotiations launched 
15 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Negotiations launched 
16 ASEAN-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement 
Signed and In Effect 
17 Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement Signed and In Effect 
18 India-Afghanistan Preferential Trading Agreement Signed and In Effect 
19 India-Bhutan Trade Agreement Signed and In Effect 
20 India-Chile Preferential Trading Agreement Signed and In Effect 
21 India-MERCOSUR Preferential Trade Agreement Signed and In Effect 
22 India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement 
Signed and In Effect 
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23 India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement Signed and In Effect 
24 India-[Republic of] Korea Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement 
Signed and In Effect 
25 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Trade Signed and In Effect 
26 Japan-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement 
Signed and In Effect 
27 Malaysia-India Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement 
Signed and In Effect 
28 South Asian Free Trade Area   Signed and In Effect 
Source: Asia Regional Integration Center, Asian Development Bank,  
Website: https://aric.adb.org/fta-country, accessed on June 22, 2017 
 
